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Abstract:
Through the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the Member States of the European Union conferred
upon the EU new exclusive competences. The EU's common commercial policy was
broadened to include foreign direct investment. However, the precise scope of the EU’s
new competence in the field of investment is not entirely clear. This presents EU deci-
sion makers in the various EU institutions with a multitude of complications. Build-
ing on the existing literature, the present paper analyses the scope of the EU’s compe-
tences pertaining to investment in light of recent developments by drawing on
precedents regarding the scope of EU competences and institutional practice. This
paper argues that, taking into account the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the
European Union, the new competence must be interpreted broadly, including the reg-
ulation of market access and material standards of protection and dispute settlement.
The first part of this paper addresses the nature and definition of competence in EU
law; the second part analyses the scope of the EU’s investment competence. The anal-
ysis sheds light on divergent institutional opinions and is followed by a discussion of
whether portfolio investments and protection standards as well as dispute settlement
are covered by the EU’s competences. The final part deals with future International
Investment Agreements and negotiations in practice.
I. Introduction
Foreign direct investment is an essential component of the world economy. The
global flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) amounted to an estimated 1.26 trillion
US dollars in 2014.1 The increased importance of global investment flows means
that rules on investment promotion and protection are vital in stimulating trade
relations and have a positive influence on the quality and quantity of investments.2
In recognition of these developments, the Member States of the European Union
conferred upon the EU new exclusive competences through the Lisbon Treaty3 in
1. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & INT’L DEV. GLOBAL INVESTMENT TRENDS MONITOR No. 18 at 3,UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2015/1, (Jan. 29, 2015), available at http://unctad.org/en/Publication-sLibrary/webdiaeia2015d1_en.pdf.2. Molly Lesher & Sebastièn Miroudot, The Economic Impact Of Investment Provisions In Regional
Trade Agreements (Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Working Paper No. 36, 2006).  For a criticalview, see, e.g. Gus Van Harten, A Critique of Investment Treaties and Investor-State Arbitration, 3JURIDIKUM 338 (2013). For an interesting discussion of 20 years of the North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA) from different perspectives, see, e.g., Jorge G. Castaneda,NAFTA’s Mixed Rec-
ord, 93 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 134 (2014); Carla A. Hills, NAFTA’s Economic Upsides, 93 FOREIGNAFFAIRS 122 (2014); Michael Wilson,NAFTA’s Unfinished Business 93 FOREIGNAFFAIRS 128 (2014).3. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing theEuropean Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty].
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2009.4 With regards to the Common Commercial Policy (i.e., the worldwide external
trade-policy representation of the internal market of the EU), these competences
were extended to include FDI.5 With this, FDI now squarely falls within the ambit
of the EU’s exclusive competences as part of its Common Commercial Policy (CCP)
pursuant to Article 3(1)(e) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU). This means that negotiation and ratification of FDI-related treaties will
now be conducted by the organs of the EU rather than by individual Member States.6
Overall, the inclusion of competences on foreign investment reflects a growing trend
in international economic agreements such as Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) to also
include rules on investment protection and promotion.7
However, the precise scope of the EU’s new competence in the field of investment
is not entirely clear and has already been the subject of countless discussions.8 This
uncertainty presents EU decision makers in the various EU institutions with a
multitude of complications,9 not least because the scope of this new competence
directly affects the range of policy options available and thus the future shape of  EU
investment policy.10 It is therefore of utmost importance to determine the precise
scope of the EU’s investment competence.
Building on the existing literature, the present paper analyses the scope of the
EU’s competences pertaining to investment in light of recent developments. The
paper conducts this analysis by drawing on precedents regarding the scope of EU
competences and institutional practice. This paper then argues that the new
competences must be interpreted broadly to include the regulation of market access
and material standards of protection and dispute settlement, if one takes into
account the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU,
formerly the European Court of Justice, ECJ).
The first part of this paper addresses the nature and definition of competence in
4. For an overview see e.g. EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (SPECIAL ISSUE:INTERNATIONALL INVESTMENTLAW ANDEUROPEANLAW) (Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel & SteffenHindelang eds., 2011).5. See Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 207, May 9,2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].6. Julie A Maupin,Where Should Europe's Investment Path Lead? Reflections on August Reinisch, "Quo
Vadis Europe?", 12 SANTACLARAJ. OF INT’LL. 183, 185 (2014).7. Marc Bungenberg, The Division of Competences between the EU and Its Member States in the Area
of Investment Politics, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 31 (MarcBungenberg, Jörn Griebel & Steffen Hindelang eds., 2011).8. See August Reinisch, The EU on the Investment Path - Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs
and other Investment Agreements, 12 SANTACLARA J. OF INT’LL. 111, 115 n.6 (2014).9. Mark A Clodfelter, The Future Direction of Investment Agreements in the European Union, 12 SANTACLARA J. OF INT’LL. 159, 161 (2014).10. Boris Rigod, "Global Europe": The EU's New Trade Policy in its Legal Context, 18 COLUMBIA J. OFEUR. L. 277, 291 (2012).
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EU law before the second part analyses the scope of the EU’s investment
competence. The analysis sheds light on divergent institutional opinions and is
followed by a discussion of whether portfolio investments and protection standards
as well as dispute settlement are covered by the EU’s competences. The second part
of this paper deals with future International Investment Agreements and
negotiations in practice.
II. Competence in EU law
Before looking at the specifics of the EU’s competences, it is important to
distinguish between the capacity to enter into treaties and agreements under
international law and the competence to do so. The former is one of the inherent and
necessary attributes of international legal personality and is enjoyed (only) by
subjects of international law.11 The latter delimits the scope and extent of that
capacity, particularly in the relationship between the EU and its Member States,
and is therefore a question of internal EU law.12 Only that capacity is of interest for
present purposes.
To most U.S. lawyers, the issues relating to EU competences appear to be
unnecessarily complicated.13 In the U.S. system, the U.S. Constitution grants the
central government exclusive power in the area of foreign affairs.14
However, the legal system of the EU cannot be compared to the federal system of
the U.S. with regard to its external powers. The EU’s competences rest on the
principle of conferral. Under article 5(2) Treaty on European Union (TEU), this
means that “the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred
upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein.
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member
States.”15 This principle also applies to the EU’s external powers.16 This explains
why a stand-off has developed between the Commission, Parliament, and the
Member States pertaining to the exact scope of the new investment competence.17
11. The ICJ recognized that international organizations must be deemed to have the powers necessaryfor the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of their purposes. See Reparation for InjuriesSuffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 182 (Apr. 11); THEOXFORDENCYCLOPAEDIAOFEUROPEANCOMMUNITYLAW 521 (Akos G. Toth ed., 1991).12. Toth, supra note 11 at 522.13. Clodfelter, supra note 9, at 161.14. Id.15 TEU art. 5(2).16. ANGELOSDIMOPOULOS, EUFOREIGN INVESTMENTLAW 67 (2011).17. Colin Brown,Changes in the Common Commercial Policy of the European Union After the Entry into
Force of the Treaty of Lisbon: A Practitioner’s Perspective, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OFINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY AFTER LISBON 174 (Marc Bungen-berg & Christoph Herrmann eds., 2013).
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On the one hand, Member States take the view that there is some form of
competence for investment left with the Member States.18 On the other hand, the
European Commission assumes a comprehensive and exclusive EU competence in
the field of investment.
Such disagreement is not novel. The following will therefore carefully elaborate
on the background of competence in EU law, in order to provide a deeper
understanding of the underlying issues, before turning to the practical questions
regarding the scope of the investment competence.19 First, the European Union does
not enjoy competence de la competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).20 Hence, the EU
may only act within the limits set out by the Treaties.21 According to Article 5(2), it
must act “within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member
States.”22 This principle of conferral23 applies to “both the internal action and the
international action of the [Union]”24 since the Treaties do not distinguish between
internal and external competences with regard to their constitutional nature.25
Second, alongside the explicit competences, such as the CCP (Arts 206ff TFEU),
the EU soon recognized the existence of its implied powers. Developed under
international law,26 the doctrine of implied powers provides for such implied
competences which may be found by interpreting the explicit provisions on
18. See Press Release, Council of the EU, Conclusions on a comprehensive European international in-vestment policy, (October 25, 2010), available at http://www.consilium.eu-ropa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/117328.pdf.19. For an interesting theoretical account of the term ‘competence,’ see Erich Vranes, Die EU-
Außenkompetenzen im Schnittpunkt von Europarecht, Völkerrecht und nationalem Recht, 133JURISTISCHEBLÄTTER 11 (2011).20. Bernhard Schima, Art 5 EUV, in KOMMENTAR ZU EUV UND AEUV ¶ 11 (Heinz Mayer ed., 2011);Jürgen Bast & Armin von Bogdandy, Art 5 EUV, in DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION:KOMMENTAR ¶ 6 (Eberhart Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf & Martin Nettesheim eds., 2014).21. DAMIAN CHALMERS; GARETH DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW: CASES ANDMATERIALS 637 (2d ed., 2010).22. TEU art. 5(2).23. Under international law it is a fundamental rule that international organizations may only exercisethose powers that have been given to them. This principle is called the principle of conferred powers,or attributed powers, or the principle of speciality; often also the French expression compétences
d’attribution is used. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996I.C.J. 66 (July 8); see alsoNiels M Blokker, International Organizations or Institutions, Implied Pow-
ers, in MAXPLANCKENCYCLOPAEDIA OFPUBLIC INTERNATIONALLAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2009).24. Opinion 2/94, On Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1996 E.C.R. I-1759, ¶ 24.25. Indeed, the CCP is listed under the Union’s exclusive competences in TFEU art. 3; cf. ROBERTSCHÜTZE, EUROPEANCONSTITUTIONALLAW 199 (2012).26. The International Court of Justice famously held that “[u]nder international law, an Organizationmust be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the [constitutional]Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of itsduties.” Reparations for Injuries, supra note 11, at 182; Blokker, supra note 23, ¶ C; JAMESCRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’SPRINCIPLESOFPUBLIC INTERNATIONALLAW 188 (2012).
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competences in connection with the purpose and aim of the treaties.27This was first
recognized in the ERTA case28 concerning the European Community's (EC) external
powers, in which the court held that the EC’s authority to enter into international
agreements “may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from
measures adopted, within the framework of these provisions, by the Community
institutions.”29 With the Treaty of Lisbon, this case law,30 albeit controversial, was
codified in TFEU article 216(1).31
Thus, in interpreting the scope of competences conferred to the Union by the
Treaties, the Union has been embracing the constitutional technique of teleological
interpretation (after initially following international law logic, i.e., in dubio
mitius32).33 It is important to note that with the exception of Germany v. European
Parliament and Council of the European Union,34 the European Court of Justice has
accepted all the teleological interpretations of Union competences by the legislator
of the EU and has itself interpreted Union legislation in a teleological manner.35
These precedents  point to the continuance of such teleological interpretations with
regards the new investment competence. Hence, when analysing the scope of the
external competences of the EU, one must take into consideration the existing case-
law of the European Courts.
III. The Scope of the EU’s Competences for Investments
The EU’s competence and decision-making rules pertaining to investment are
provided in Article 207 of the CCP. Generally, the scope of the CCP, after the entry
into force of the Lisbon amendments, covers all matters relating to trade in goods
27. Schima, supra note 20, ¶ 17.28. Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities,1971 E.C.R. 263.29. Id. ¶ 16.30. Id.; Opinion 1/76, 1977 E.C.R. 741, 2 C.M.L.R. 279; Joined Cases 3, 4 & 6/76, Kramer et. al., 1976E.C.R. 1279.31. Chalmers, Davies & Monti, supra note 21, 640. For a critical view on the ‘attempt’ to codify this caselaw, see e.g.Marise Cremona, A Constitutional Basis for Effective External Action? An Assessment of
the Provisions on EU External Action in the Constitutional Treaty, (Eur. U. Inst. Working Paper,Nov. 30, 2006).32. Case 8/55, Federation Charbonniere de Belgique v. High Authority of the European Coal and SteelCommunity; 1955 E.C.R. 245.33. Schütze, supra note 25, 155. See, most famously, Case C-84/94, United Kingdom of Great Britainand Northern Ireland v. Council, 1996 E.C.R. I-5755.34. Case 376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament and Council of the EuropeanUnion, 2000 E.C.R. I-08419.35. Case 376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament and Council of the EuropeanUnion, 2000 E.C.R. I-08419. For accepting teleological interpretations of EU competences see e.g.Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München, Case 9/74 E.C.R. 773 (1974); United Kingdom of GreatBritain and Northern Ireland v. Council, Case C-84/94 E.C.R. I-5 755 (1996).
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and services, commercial aspects of intellectual property, and FDI pursuant to
Article 207(1) TFEU.36 The EU is hence expressly entitled to adopt unilateral
measures and conclude international agreements in that regard.37
Article 207(6) TFEU then establishes two general external limits to the CCP.38
First, the exercise of the CCP competence “shall not affect the delimitation of
competences between the Union and the Member States.” This indicates an explicit
rejection of the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court decision in State of
Missouri v Holland.39 In Holland, a 1920 decision, the Supreme Court held that
Congress is empowered under the Constitution to implement treaties through
federal law, even if those laws were otherwise beyond Congress’s other Article I
powers. TFEU article 207(6) makes clear that the EU’s CCP competence should find
a systemic limit in the internal competences of the EU.40 Furthermore, the exercise
of the CCP competence is not supposed to lead to harmonization of national
provisions, where the treaties exclude such harmonization. This incorporates the
“express saving clauses” found in other policy areas into the CCP.41
A. Legislative History
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the then-EC had neither express
nor implied exclusive competences in the area of international investment.42 The EC
possessed only shared competences in the field of international investment.43 On
this basis, the EC has negotiated agreements covering investment in services and
acted in the field of investment pertaining to access/admission rules.44 Competences
regarding investment protection and protection against unfair or uncompensated
36. Robert Schütze, European Community and Union, Decision-Making and Competences on Interna-
tional Law Issues, iMAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 6 (RüdigerWolfrum ed., 2011).37. Id.38. Id. ¶ 7.39. State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Schütze, supra note 36.40. Schütze, supra note 36; Thomas Cottier & Lorena Trinberg, Artikel 207 AEUV, in EUROPÄISCHESUNIONSRECHT ¶ 146 (Hans von der Groeben, Jürgen Schwarze & Armin Hatje eds., 7th ed., 2015).41. See Schütze, supra note 36.42. Wenhua Shan & Sheng Zhang,The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way toward a Common Investment Policy,21 EUR. J. OF INT’LL. 1049, 1050 (2010).43. “All Union agreements, including foreign investment provisions, are mixed agreements, withoutincluding a declaration of competence, providing only in a general manner that the EU and its Mem-ber States act within thescope of their respective competence.” ANGELOSDIMOPOULOS, EUFOREIGNINVESTMENT LAW 66 (2011); Wenhua Shan, Towards a Common European Community Policy on
Investment Issues, 2 J. OFWORLD INVESTMENT 603 (2001).44. Niklas Maydell, The European Community’s Minimum Platform on Investment or the Trojan Horse
of Investment Competence, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTLAW INCONTEXT 73-92 (August Reinisch& Christina Knahr eds., 2008).
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expropriation remained with the Member States, which concluded Bilateral
Investment Treaties to that effect.45 This meant that, unlike the US, the EU has not
included comprehensive investment provisions covering liberalization and
investment protection in any preferential trade agreements.46
Most EU Member States’ governments believed that a comprehensive investment
competence was necessary to adapt to the realities of the world economy.47 In
recognition of the fact that financial flows supplement trade in goods, and today they
represent a significant share of commercial exchanges, the governments decided to
extend the exclusive competences provided by the CCP.48 However, it was only at a
later stage that the European Convention for a Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe included in its proposal the competences for FDI in the CCP chapter.49
The reason why it was eventually included may be explained in light of the
negotiations surrounding the WTO Doha Round, where investment policy was
initially on the agenda. The FDI competence was therefore necessary for the EU to
conclude any final agreements in Doha.50
Its inclusion was not uncontested, however. The German and the French
foreign ministers of that time, along with other delegates, suggested, without
success, that FDI be deleted from the CCP chapter.51 Surprisingly, FDI was
preserved as it stood in the Constitutional Treaty even during the Lisbon Treaty
negotiations, although its consequences were already being discussed,52 and
investment policy was removed from the WTO Doha Agenda in 2003.53 Eventually,
the wording of Article 207 of the TFEU identically reflected Article III-315 of the
45. Stephen Woolcock, EU Trade and Investment Policymaking After the Lisbon Treaty, 45INTERECONOMICS 22, 23 (2010).46. Id.47. Wolfgang Weiß, Art 206 TFEU, in DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION: KOMMENTAR ¶ 2(Eberhart Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf & Martin Nettesheim eds., 2011).48. Draft Articles on External Action in the Constitutional Treaty, CONV 685/03, 23 Apr. 2003, at 54
available at http://european-convention.europa.eu/pdf/reg/en/03/cv00/cv00685.en03.pdf.49. Marc Bungenberg, The Division of Competences between the EU and Its Member States in the Area
of Investment Politics, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 30-31 (MarcBungenberg, Jörn Griebel & Steffen Hindelang eds., 2011).50. Id.51. Reinisch, supra note 8, at 2.52. JAN CEYSSENS, TOWARDS A COMMON FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICY?—FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION, 32 Legal Issues Of Econ. Integration 259, 278FF (2005);JOACHIMKARL, THE COMPETENCE FOR FOREIGNDIRECT INVESTMENT: NEW POWERS FOR THE
EUROPEANUNION?, 5 J. OFWORLD INVESTMENT AND TRADE 413FF (2004).53. See for example: Paul Sauvé,Multilateral Rules on Investment: Is forward Movement Possible?, 9 J.
OF INT’L ECON. L. 325 (2006). On the Cancun Ministerial Summit in general see e.g. JagdishBhagwati,Don’t Cry for Cancun, 83 FOREIGNAFFAIRS 52 (2004); Razeen Sally, The End of the Road
for the WTO? 5WORLDECONOMICS 1 (2004); Bungenberg , supra note 7, at 31.
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Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe54 with regards to the FDI
competence.
B. Foreign Direct Investment (Article 207 TFEU)
The text of Article 207 of the TFEU, regarding the CCP, follows the former Article
131 of the Treaty of the European Community (TEC) but it adds the words “foreign
direct investment” in parallel to “international trade” as the areas in which the
Union intends to progressively prohibit restrictions.55 Pursuant to TFEU Article
3(1)(e), as the EU enjoys exclusive competence in the entire CCP, this also covers
FDI.56
The inclusion of FDI in the CCP has attracted great interest and discussion
among European and international scholars,57 mostly because there is neither any
definition of the term “foreign direct investment” in the treaties, nor any clarification
of the exact scope of the FDI competence under the CCP.58 A more precise definition
would have been desirable, since foreign direct investment in practice necessitates
a broad regulatory framework.59 It is questionable, however, whether all aspects of
the regulation of foreign investment are covered by the FDI competence as included
in the TFEU.
Since the relevant provisions do not provide any guidance regarding the scope of
the new investment competence, five main interpretations have been advanced.60
The interpretation put forward here follows the so-called “Comprehensive FDI
Competence” Interpretation,61 which provides for an exclusive EU competence to
enter into international obligations similar to those included in the U.S. Free-Trade
Agreements.62 This interpretation covers admission, capital movement (transfer),
post-admission treatment including fair and equitable treatment (FET),
54. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe as approved by the Intergovernmental Confer-ence, Jun. 18, 2004, OJ C310/01, available at: http://eur-lex.eu-ropa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML.55. Shan and Zhang, supra note 42, 1058.56. Rafael Leal-Arcas, The European Union’s new common commercial policy after the Treaty of Lisbon,
in THE TREATY OF LISBON AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 271 (Martin Trybus &Luca Rubini eds., 2012).57. See Reinisch, supra note 8.58. Shan & Zhang , supra note 42, 1058.59. Wolfgang Weiß, Art 207 AEUV, in DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION: KOMMENTAR ¶ 40(Eberhart Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf & Martin Nettesheim eds., 2011).60. For an overview, see Shan & Zhang, supra note 42, at 1061ff (with further references).61. Cf id. at 1064.62. Marc Bungenberg, Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon, in EUROPEANYEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONALECONOMICLAW 143 (Christoph Herrmann & Jörg Philipp Terhechteeds., 2010).
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performance requirements and free movement of key personnel, compensation for
expropriation, and investor–state dispute settlement.63 Indeed, the European
Commission assumes that all such issues typically regulated in bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) fall under this new exclusive competence of the EU.64 It should be
noted that the Council adopts a contrary view and insists on national rather than
EU competences regarding the protection of expropriation and dispute resolution
clauses.65 These issues are addressed in the following sections.
1. Definition of Investment
The concept of “investment” is not clearly established in international investment
law.66 Most modern BITs adopt a broad definition of investment.67 For example, an
ICSID arbitral tribunal described it in the Salini Construttori case as the following:
The doctrine generally considers that investment infers: contributions, as certain
duration of performance of the contract and a participation in the risks of the
transaction . . . [and] the contribution to the economic development of the host State
of the investment.68
Here, a distinction between portfolio investments and FDI is generally accepted,69
with the distinguishing factors being durability and influence in decision-making
processes. FDI usually creates durable economic ties and is directed by long-term
profits,70 whereas portfolio investment focuses on establishing rather short-term
relationships between an investor and the enterprise and are focused on earnings
emanating from the acquisition as well as sales of shares and other securities.71
European law has traditionally distinguished between direct investment and
63. Angelos Dimopoulos, The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing Parallelism be-
tween Internal and External Economic Relations? 4 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OFEUR. L. AND POL’Y 23-25 (2008); cf. Shan and Zhang supra note 42, 1064.64. Nikos Lavranos, New Developments in the Interaction between International Investment Law and
EU Law, 9 L. &PRAC.OF INT’LCTS. & TRIBUNALS 409, 412 (2010).65. Frank Hoffmeister, Aktuelle Rechtsfragen in der Praxis der europäischen Außenhandelspolitik,ZEITSCHRIFTFÜREUROPARECHTLICHE STUDIEN 385, 391 (2013).66. Christoph Schreuer, Investments, international protection, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OFPUBLIC INTERNATIONALLAW ¶36 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2011);  Michael Hwang S.C., Recent Devel-
opments in Defining “Investment”, 25 ICSIDREV. FOREIGN INV. L. J. 21-25 (2010).67. August Reinisch, Future Shape of EU Investment Agreements, 28 ICSIDREV. FOREIGN INV. L. J. 181(2013).68. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4,Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001).69. See RUDOLFDOLZER&CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLESOF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTLAW 64(2008).70. IMF, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION MANUAL 86 (6th ed.,2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/bopman.pdf.71. OECD, BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 22 (4th ed., 2008), available athttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/50/40193734.pdf.
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indirect or portfolio investment.72 The ECJ’s interpretation of the term “direct
investment”73—as formerly used in article 57(2) of the TEC and now article 64(2) of
the TFEU, in accordance with Directive 88/361/EEC74—follows this distinction.75
The International Monetary Fund76 (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development77 (OECD) have similarly defined foreign direct
investment.78 Based on these definitions, FDI is understood as requiring the
establishment of lasting direct relations between the investor and the company in
question, which is satisfied when the owned shares or voting power amounts to at
least 10 per cent.79
In its much-debated Lisbon Judgment, the German Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) wrote—citing a commentator80—that “[m]uch,
however, argues in favour of assuming that the term ‘foreign direct investment’ only
encompasses investment which serves to obtain a controlling interest in an
enterprise.”81 It concluded that investment protection agreements that cover
portfolio investments would have to be concluded as mixed agreements and
therefore would have to be negotiated and concluded by not only the EU but also by
its individual Member States.82
Different arguments have been made in response. On the one hand, the argument
that TFEU article 207(1) does not encompass portfolio investments is compelling,
72. Weiß, supra note 59, ¶46.73. Case C-446/04, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litig. v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R.I-11753, ¶ 177.74. Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty,1988 O.J. (L 178) 5.75. See Case C-112/05, Commission v. Germany, 2007 E.C.R. I-08995, ¶ 18; Case C-174/04, Commissionv. Italy, 2005 E.C.R. I-04933, ¶ 28; Commission v Netherlands, Joined cases C-282/04 & C-283/04,2006 E.C.R. I-9141, ¶ 19.76. The IMF defines ‘direct investment’ as reflecting the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by anentity resident in one country in an enterprise resident in another economy. The lasting interestimplies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise anda significant degree of influence by the investor on the management of the enterprise: IMF, Balance
Of Payment Manual (5th ed., 1993), available atwww.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bopman/bopman.pdf.77. See OECD, BENCHMARKDEFINITIONOFFOREIGNDIRECT INVESTMENT 48(4th ed., 2008).78. Shan & Zhang, supra note 42, at 1059.79. Clodfelter, supra note 9, at 660 pointing out that “[t]he 10 per cent benchmark has been character-ised as having indicative value, further indications, which may be relevant in an overall assessment,comprising criteria such as the representation of an investor in the Board of Directors, participationin the policy-making process, inter-company transactions, interchange of managerial personnel, pro-vision of technical information, and provision of long-term loans at lower than existing market rates.”
Id. with further references.80. CHRISTIAN TIETJE, DIE AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG DER EU NACH DEM VERTRAG VONLISSABON (2009).81. Lisbon Treaty Judgment, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, June 30, 2009, par. 379, available at http://www.bun-desverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html.82. For the contrary view, see e.g., Hoffmeister, supra note 65, at 390.
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since any other interpretation would disregard the explicit wording of “foreign direct
investment” in that article.83On the other hand, Hoffmeister argues for an exclusive
competence also covering portfolio investments on the basis of article 207(1),
invoking an argumentum a maiore ad minus: If the ‘strong’ form of investments, i.e.,
direct investments, are covered by the competence, the less intensive version of
investments, i.e., portfolio investments, must be covered as well.84 Indeed, most
modern BIT’s include both direct and indirect investments. As a result, limiting the
scope of the investment competence to only FDI would effectively render the
inclusion of investment as an exclusive competence within the ambit of the CCP
devoid of any practical meaning.85 Additionally, any other interpretation would run
counter to the clear intention of the drafters “to maximise the coherence and
efficiency of EU external action.”86
An exclusive competence covering portfolio investments may also be found in
TFEU Articles 63ff in connection with article 3(2).87 Article 63 provides that the
movement of capital between Member States of the Union and third countries shall
be free of restrictions, including also portfolio investments.88 Article 3(2) provides for
83. See also Jörg Philipp Terhechte, Article 351 TFEU: The Principle of Loyalty and the Future Role of
the Member States' Bilateral Investment Treaties, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONALECONOMICLAW 79 (Christoph Herrmann & Jörg Philipp Terhechte eds., 2011). See also Jan AsmusBischoff, Just a Little BIT of ‘‘Mixity’’? The EU’s Role in the Field of International Investment
Protection Law, 48 COMMONMARKET L. REV. 1537 (2011); Julien Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of
the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment—How will the New EU Competence on FDI affect
the Emerging Global Regime?, 15 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 51, 58 (2012); Christian Tietje, Die
Gemeinsame Handelspolitik der EU im System des Welthandelsrechts: ein Spannungsverhältnis
zwischen fortschreitender Liberalisierung und zunehmendem Protektionismus, in EUROPÄISCHEUNION NACH LISSABON: BEITRÄGE ZU ORGANISATION, AUSSENBEZIEHUNGEN UND STELLUNG IMWELTHANDELSRECHT 51 (Meinhard Hilf & Eckhard Pache eds.,2009); Marc Bungenberg, Going
Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OFINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 146f (Christoph Herrmann & Jörg Philipp Terhechte eds., 2010);Till Müller-Ibold, Vorbem Art 206-207 AEUV, in EU-VERTRÄGE, KOMMENTAR ¶ 19 (Carl-Otto Lenz& Klaus Dieter Borchardt eds., 5th ed. 2010); Christoph Ohler, Die Umsetzung der Gemeinsamen
Handelspolitik nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, in RECHTSFRAGEN DER IMPLEMENTIERUNG DESVERTRAGSVONLISSABON 431(Thomas Eilmansberger, Stefan Griller & Walter Obwexer eds., 2011).84. Hoffmeister, supra note 65, at 385; Frank Hoffmeister,Wider die German Angst – Ein Plädoyer für
die transatlantische Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft (TTIP), 53 ARCHIVDESVÖLKERRECHTS56 (2015).85. Similarly Hoffmeister,Wider die German Angst, supra note 84, at 56.86. Final Report Of Working Group VII On External Action, CONV 459/02 (Dec 16, 2002), at 16, ¶ 19,
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/deve/20030218/489393EN.pdf.Hoffmeister,Wider die German Angst, supra note 84, at 56.87. Vranes, supra note 19, at 15; Hoffmeister,Wider die German Angst, supra note 84, at 56-57; Euro-
pean Commission, Proposal For A Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council:
Establishing A Framework For Managing Financial Responsibility Linked To Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Tribunals Established By International Agreements To Which The European Union Is
Party, at 3, COM (2012) 335 final (June 21, 2012).88. This includes portfolio investments, see Directive of the Council 88/361,O.J. 1988, L 178/5, Annex 1and ECJ, Case 282/04 and 283/04, Commission v. Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2007: 608, ¶ 9.
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the exclusive competence of the Union whenever rules included in an international
agreement “may affect common rules or alter their scope.”89 For portfolio
investments, the series of company law and capital market Directives90 establish
such a harmonized regulatory framework, which would be affected by provisions
generally included in investment agreements.91 Thus, in line with the Commission’s
view,92 the EU enjoys an exclusive competence over matters of portfolio
investment.93
Supporting this conclusion, the established EU doctrine of implied powers (now
codified in Article 216(1) of the TFEU) suggests that the expansive teleological94
interpretation adopted by the European Courts95 is likely to be continued.96 It is
therefore very probable that the Court, when called to rule on this issue, will
consider portfolio investments to be within the EU’s implied external powers on the
basis of Articles 63 and 64 of the TFEU.97
In practice, the Council of the EU has provided the Commission with a mandate
89. Critically see among many Weiß, supra note 59, ¶ 46.90. E.g. Directive 2001/34/EC on the admission of securities to official stock exchange listing and oninformation to be published on those securities, 2001 O.J. L184/1; Directive 85/611/EEC on the coor-dination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collectiveinvestment in transferable securities (UCITS), 1985 O.J. L375/3; Directive 2001/108/EC amendingCouncil Directive 85/611/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisionsrelating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS), with regard toinvestments of UCITS, 2002 O.J. L41/35; Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instrumentsamending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the EuropeanParliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. L145/1.91. Hoffmeister,Wider die German Angst, supranote 84, at 57. For the opposite conclusion, arguing thatMember States still retain considerable powers in light of the broad scope of regulatory measuresaffecting portfolio investment, see e.g. Dimopoulos, supra note 43, at 105.92. The European Parliament appears to generally share this approach, see Resolution of the EuropeanParliament of  6.4.2011, ¶ 11.93. For an authority sharing this view, seeHoffmeister,Wider die German Angst, supra note 84, at 57.94. Indeed, the European Court has accepted almost all teleological interpretations of EU competences,
see, e.g. Case C-9/74, Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München, 1974 E.C.R. 773; Case C-84/94,United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Council, 1996 E.C.R. I-5 755.95. SeeCase 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities,1971 E.C.R. 263. In this so-called ERTA Case the ECJ affirmed the implied powers doctrine by stat-ing that the authority to enter into international agreements “arises not only from an express con-ferment by the Treaty but may equally flow implicitly from other provisions of the Treaty, from theact of accession and from measures adopted within the framework of those provisions, by the Com-munity institutions.”; see also Opinion 2/91, Convention No. 170 of the International Labour Organ-ization,1993 E.C.R. I-1061 (“Authority to enter into international commitments may not only arisefrom an express attribution by the Treaty, but may also flow implicitly from its provisions [ . . . ]whenever Community law created for the institutions of the Community powers within its internalsystem for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the Community had authority to enter intothe international commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the absence ofan express provision in that connection.”).96. Reinisch, supra note 8, at 141.97. Id.
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pertaining to current investment treaty negotiations to include also portfolio
investments. The Council has, however, retained its right to conclude such
agreements as so-called mixed agreements (i.e., agreements negotiated and
concluded by both the EU and its Member States).98
2. Investment Protection
Another contested issue is the question of whether the new investment
competence only covers the liberalization of investment (i.e., the pre-establishment
phase) or covers post-establishment measures and protection as well.99 Past
investment-related agreements of the EC/EU were limited to that of admission, in
which a GATS-inspired market access approach was adopted.100 However, the
Commission now takes the view that the new EU’s investment power covers not only
investment access/admission matters (generally not regulated by BITs)101 but also
comprises all standards of investment protection included in International
Investment Agreements (IIAs) or BITs, respectively (including expropriation).102
While this assertion by the Commission has been challenged,103 it must be noted
that, as is reflected in the ECJ’s Opinion 1/78, the objective of the CCP is not confined
to trade liberalization but also covers trade regulation.104 Thus, the new FDI
competence should be interpreted as also covering investment protection and
98. Hoffmeister, supra note 65, 391.99. DAVID KLEIMANN, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, TAKING STOCK: EU COMMONCOMMERCIAL POLICY IN THE LISBON ERA, (April 29, 2011), available at http://www.ceps.eu/sys-tem/files/book/2011/04/WD%20345%20Kleimann%20on%20EU%20CCP.pdf.100. CHRISTIAN TIETJE, DIE AUSSENWIRTSCHAFSVERFASSUNG DER EU NACH DEM VERTRAG VONLISSABON 14 (2009).101. See e.g. Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 69, at 79ff.102. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a
framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals
established by international agreements to which the European Union is party, COM (2012) 335 final,at 3 available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149567.pdf.103. See further Reinisch, supra note 8, 131; Tietje, supra note 100; T. R. Braun, Füreinen
komplementären, europäischen Investitionsschutz, in INTERNATIONALER INVESTITIONSSCHUTZUNDEUROPARECHT 191 (Marc Bungenberg, et al. eds., 2010). For a discussion of different interpretationssee Shan and Zhang, supra note 42, at 1061; SVEN JOHANNSEN&ERIK LEIF , DIEKOMPETENZDEREUROPÄISCHEN UNION FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHE DIREKTINVESTITIONEN NACH DEM VERTRAG VONLISSABON 15 (2009).104. Opinion 1/78, Natural Rubber Agreement, 1979 E.C.R. 2871, at ¶¶ 39–49. In this opinion, the ECJstated: “A ‘commercial policy’ understood in that sense would be destined to become nugatory in thecourse of time. Although it may be thought that at the time when the EC treaty was drafted liberal-ization of trade was the dominant idea, it nevertheless does not form a barrier to the possibility ofthe Community’s developing a commercial policy aiming at a regulation of the world market forcertain products rather than at a mere liberalization of trade.”
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regulation measures.105
In supporting its claim, the Commission invokes the case law of the ECJ, which
has consistently held that the Union’s competence for the common commercial policy
includes obligations that apply to post-establishment matters even when Member
States retain the possibility of adopting internal rules.106 It is thus well-established
that the Union's competence in the field of trade in goods also covers post-
importation matters, such as the granting of national treatment and most favored
nation treatment in respect of taxes and other internal laws and regulations, or the
abolition of unnecessary obstacles to trade arising from technical regulations and
standards.107 The same must be true for investment. Hence, the competence covers
the standards which apply to post-establishment matters, including national and
most-favoured nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment and protection
against expropriation without compensation.108
In regard to expropriation, some authors have invoked TFEU Article 345 in
efforts to exclude expropriation from the scope of the EU’s newly acquired
investment competence.109 Article 345 provides that “[t]he Treaties shall in no way
prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership.”
However, treaties providing for investor protection do not affect the system of
property ownership.110 Instead, these treaties require that expropriation be subject
to certain conditions (e.g., the payment of compensation).111 Additionally, in light of
settled case law of the ECJ, Article 345 has been preponderantly construed rather
narrowly as merely constituting a restriction on the exercise of competences and not
as a negation of the existence of competences in particular.112 Indeed, a footnote
excluding expropriation from the scope of the FDI competence was eventually
105. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a comprehensive Euro-
pean international investment policy, COM (2010) 343 final (July 7, 2010), [hereinafter 2010 Com-mission Communication], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tra-doc_146307.pdf.; August Reinisch, 207 AEUV, inKOMMENTARZUEUVUNDAEUV, ¶ 26 (Heinz Mayered., 2011).106. Opinion 1/94 of the European Court of Justice, 1994 E.C.R. I-5267, ¶ 29, ¶¶ 32-33.107. 2010 Commission Communication, supra note 105, at 3.108. Id. at 4.109. See e.g. Kingreen Thorsten, Artikel 345, in EUV/AEUV:KOMMENTAR ¶ 5 (Christian Calliess & Mat-thias Ruffert eds., 2011), referring also to divergent views.110. 2010 Commission Communication, supra note 105, at 8.111. Id.112. Id.; sharing this view see e.g. Christoph Hermann, Die Zukunft der mitgliedstaatlichen
Investitionspolitik Nach Dem Vertrag Von Lissabon, 77 Europäische Zeitschrift FürWirtschaftsrecht207 (2010); Marc Bungenberg, The Division of Competences between the EU and Its Member States
in the Area of Investment Politics, in European Yearbook Of International Economic Law. 36 (MarcBungenberg, Jörn Griebel & Steffen Hindelang eds., 2011); Ingo Brinker, Artikel 295, in Eu-Kommentar ¶ 6 (Jürgen Schwarze ed., 2000).See alsoCase 182/83Fearon v Irish Land Commission,1984 ECR 3677.
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removed.113
Furthermore, it is important to note that with the inclusion of FDI, the drafters
of the treaty clearly intended to broaden the EU’s competence rather than to restrict
it.114 Adopting a teleological interpretation, the main aim and purpose of investment
treaties (be it investment chapters in FTAs or BITs) is to promote investments by
guaranteeing, among other things non-discriminatory treatment of investors from
either contracting party by granting most favoured nation treatment, fair and
equitable treatment, free transfer of capital without restrictions, and compensation
in case of unjustified expropriation.115 A competence of the EU in that regard must
therefore be interpreted in light of these considerations. It is worth noting in this
respect that in light of the past positions taken by the Court of Justice for analogous
situations, the Commission’s justification of the EU competences is rather
convincing.116
3. Dispute Settlement
With respect to dispute settlement, the European Commission concludes that
procedural guarantees in the form of state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) are covered by the EU’s investment powers.117Having established
that the EU’s exclusive competence covers post-establishment issues, this must also
include the necessary procedural guarantees.118 Dispute settlement fulfils a crucial
function in effectively securing the substantive protections granted by International
Investment Agreements.119
The competence for investor-state dispute settlement has also been recognized by
113. Clodfelter, supra note 9, at 661 with further references.114. Markus Burgstaller, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties of EU Member States, inINTERNATIONALER INVESTITIONSSCHUTZ UND EUROPARECHT 55, 64 (Marc Bungenberg, et al. eds.,2010).115. Id. at 413.116. Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Financial Responsibility In The European International Investment Policy(LSE L., Soc. and Econ. Working Papers 5, 2013); ANGELOSDIMOPOULOS, EUFOREIGN INVESTMENTLAW 122-124 (2011).117. Reinisch, supra note 8, at 118.118. Id. While the CJEU rejected the EU’s accession to the European Convention of Human Rights, itexpressly held that ‘an international agreement providing for the creation of a court responsible forthe interpretation of its provisions and whose decisions are binding on the institutions, including theCourt of Justice, is not, in principle, incompatible with EU law.’ Opinion 2/13, Accession of the Eu-
ropean Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (18 December 2014) at ¶ 182. For a discussion of this opinion in the context of investor-dispute settlement mechanisms, see Stephan Schill, Editorial: Opinion 2/13 – The End for Dispute
Settlement in EU Trade and Investment Agreements?, 16 J. OFWORLD INVESTMENT& TRADE 379(2015).119. Reinisch, supra note 8, at 132, with further references.
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the EU’s legislature, as is reflected in secondary law. For example, Article 13 of the
grandfathering regulation120 provides the European Commission with considerable
powers to participate in proceedings initiated against Member States on the basis of
existing BITs of EU Member States.121 Pursuant to Article 13 of the regulation, the
Commission may direct the respective Member States to take or refrain from taking
a particular position or action during the dispute settlement proceedings.122 Where
appropriate, the Commission may even be granted standing to take part in the
defense of a Member State in the context of an ISDS initiated by a third state
investor.123 This means that the EU (as represented by the Commission) will be the
sole defendant when Member State measures become the subject of investment
arbitration claims within a Member State by investors from third party countries.124
Since investor-state awards by arbitral tribunals are susceptible to annulments
or denials of recognition and enforcement in Member State courts, questions that
arise with regard to the relationship of these arbitration treaties and EU law face
two sets of imperatives: those flowing from the obligation to uphold, recognize, and
enforce awards under the arbitration treaties and those flowing from obligations to
comply with EU law.125 This appears to remain an open question, especially with a
view to the principle of the autonomy of EU law.126
In practice, investor-to-state dispute settlement in future EU IIAs has been one
of the most contentious issues during negotiations. This criticism has been
particularly strong regarding the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the EU and the U.S.127 The European
120. Regulation No. 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2012 Estab-lishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Treaties Between Member States andThird Countries, O.J. (L 351) 40.121. Nikos Lavranos, In Defence of Member States' BITs Gold Standard: The Regulation 1219/2012 es-
tablishing a Transitional Regime for existing Extra-EU BITs: A Member State's Perspective, 10TRANSNATIONALDISPUTEMANAGEMENT 10 (2013).122. Id.123. Id.124. 2010 Commission Communication, supra note 105; George A Bermann, European Union Law Issue
dedicated to Jean-Claude Piris: Essay: Reconciling European Union Law demands with the demands
of International Arbitration, 34 FORDHAM INT’LL. J. 1193, 1213 (2011).125. Bermann, supra note 124, at 1215.126. See further Steffen Hindelang, The Autonomy of the European Legal Order: EU Constitutional Lim-
its to Investor-State Arbitration on the Basis of Future EU Investment-Related Agreements, inEUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Marc Bungenberg & ChristophHerrmann eds., 2013).127. Most recently, Shawn Donnan & Stefan Wagstyl, Transatlantic trade talks hit German snag,FINANCIAL TIMES (March 14, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cc5c4860-ab9d-11e3-90af-00144feab7de.html.  According to this report the German government pushes ISDS to be excludedfrom a future trade and investment deal with the US. See also Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Deutschland
zieht rote Linie bei TTIP - keine privaten Schiedsgerichte, NZZ (May 3, 2015), available athttp://www.nzz.ch/finanzen/newsticker/deutschland-zieht-rote-linie-bei-ttip---keine-privaten-schiedsgerichte-1.18534559.
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Parliament voiced its concerns about the far-reaching implications of ISDS, which
might compromise the right to regulate.128 To counter such criticism, the
Commission prepared a fact sheet on Investment Protection and Investor-to-State
Dispute Settlement in EU agreements providing for a “two-pronged approach”
working towards “clarifying and improving investment protection rules” and
“improving how the dispute settlement system operates.”129Concerning the Canada-
EU FTA (CETA) and TTIP, the European Commission intended to establish an
appellate body for investor-state disputes.130 To date, CETA and the EU-Vietnam
FTA draft texts include a so-called investment court system with the possibility of
appellate review.131 The negotiations concerning TTIP have excluded the investment
issue for now.
Regarding financial responsibility,132 the EU has adopted a Regulation that
establishes a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-
state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which
the European Union is party.133 The regulation addresses the issue of allocating
responsibility and financial liability between Member States and the EU.134 The
Commission recognized the need to establish a framework for managing the
financial consequences of ISDS.135 This is a further important step in defining the
future shape of the European international investment policy, clearing the path for
substitution of the Member State’s BITs with EU agreements.136 The Regulation
builds on the one agreement to which the EU is already a party with the possibility
128. Resolution on the future European International Investment Policy, EUR PARL. 2010/2203 (INI)(March 22, 2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/get-Doc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-0141&language=EN; see e.g.. Reinisch, Future Shape of
EU Investment Agreements, supra note 67, at 192.129. European Commission, Fact Sheet: Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlementin EU Agreements (Nov. 2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tra-doc_151916.pdf.130. European Commission, Fact Sheet: Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement(CETA) 3 (Dec. 2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tra-doc_151918.pdf;European Commission, Fact Sheet: Investment Protection and Investor-to-StateDispute Settlement (ISDS) in EU Agreements 2 (Mar. 2014) available at http://trade.ec.eu-ropa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152273.pdf.131. See infra notes 151 and 152.132. For a recent discussion see e.g. Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Financial Responsibility in European Inter-
national Investment Policy, 63 INT’L&COMP. L. Q. 449 (2014).133. Regulation 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework for
Managing Financial Responsibility Linked to Investor-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals Estab-
lished by International Agreements to which the European Union is Party, O.J. 2014, L 257/121.134. Reinisch, supra note 8, 133.135. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a
framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals
established by international agreements to which the European Union is party, COM (2012) 335 final,
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149567.pdf.136. Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 116, at 2.
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for ISDS, namely the Energy Charter Treaty.137
The central principle guiding the regulation is that financial responsibility
flowing from ISDS is to be attributed to the actor which has afforded the treatment
in dispute. For treatment afforded by the Union, the Union shall act as respondent
pursuant to Article 4 of the Regulation, whereas if a Member State afforded the
treatment in dispute, the Member State shall act as respondent pursuant to Article
5 of the Regulation. Also, where the actions of the Member State are required by EU
law, financial responsibility lies with the Union according to Article 3(1)(c) of the
Regulation.
Among the issues that must be addressed is the fact that Article 3(1)(c) of the
Regulation would expose the EU to financial responsibility for (under EU law)
perfectly legal legislative acts in the case where an arbitral tribunal considers the
EU to be in breach of standards of an investment treaty. While not surprising from
the perspective of existing BITs, this would significantly alter the traditional
institutional approach towards the liability of the EU.138
The regulation also includes rules on the conduct of ISDS procedures under which
it is largely at the Commission’s discretion as to who will act as respondent when
non-EU investors are bringing a claim. In addition to rules on how to structure co-
operation between the Commission and the Member State in specific cases, the
mechanisms also ensure that any apportionment can be made effective.
However, it is important to recall that any such criteria for allocating
responsibility must find their basis in the provisions of the EU investment
agreement under which the foreign investor is bringing his or her claim.139 This
means that, in order to have effect under public international law, the proposed rules
regarding the determination of responsibility in this Regulation must be included in
the future EU investment agreement. Hence, for the sake of legal certainty, it is
important that any future EU investment agreement contains such a clarification.140
In order to avoid circumvention of the effective application of this Regulation, further
clarification is needed to the effect that future EU IIAs must completely and
effectively supersede existing BITs of Member States with the same third state.141
137. See Energy Charter Treaty, Annex 1 to the Final Act of the Conference on the European EnergyCharter, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 381 (1995).138. Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 131, 461-462; Christian Tietje, Emily Sipiorski & Grit Töpfer,Respon-
sibility In Investor-State-Arbitration In The Eu: Managing Financial Responsibility Linked To In-
vestor-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals Established By The Eu’s International Investment Agree-
ments (2012), available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/de/responsibility-in-investor-state-arbitration-in-the-eu-pbBB3012131/.139. Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 116, at 8.140. Id.141. Id. at 9.
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IV. Future IIAs/ investment chapters in FTAs and Negotiations in
Practice
With the conferral of exclusive EU competence in the FDI area, the EU will shape
and elaborate autonomous FDI principles and policies.142 Investment protection and
liberalization are key instruments of such an international investment policy. In the
Commission’s view, “a common investment policy should also be guided by the
principles and objectives of the Union's external action more generally, including the
promotion of the rule of law, human rights, and sustainable development (TFEU
Article 205 and TEU Article 21).”143 The commission obviously seeks to address all
types of investment including portfolio investments and to assimilate the area of
investment protection.144 The uniform treatment for all EU investors will ensure
external competitiveness and maximum leverage in negotiations,145 while allowing
investors to take into account the political, institutional, and economic
circumstances in particular countries. The Commission intends to follow the
available best practices in order to ensure that no EU investor would be worse off
than they would be under Member States’ BITs.146
In practice, this suggests that future EU IIAs will include all the standards of
substantive treatment of investments currently contained in EU Member State
BITs.147 Also, while most of the BITs of EU Member States limit protection to the
post-establishment phase,148 the Commission has explicitly declared EU policy on
international investment as one that adheres to an investment liberalization
objective.149
The Council Negotiating Directives of September 12, 2011 concerning the
negotiations with Canada, India, and Singapore150 confirm the EU’s comprehensive
investment power in practice by outlining that fair and equitable treatment (FET),
142. Bermann, supra note 124, at 1214.143. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive European
International Investment Policy at 9, COM (2010) 343 final.144. Id. at 11.145. Id.146. Id.147. Reinisch, supra note 8, at 126.148. Cf. August Reinisch, Austria, inCOMMENTARIESONSELECTEDMODEL INVESTMENTTREATIES15, 27(Chester Brown ed., 2013). Indeed it is argued that most BITs ‘worldwide’ provide for protection post-establishment only, see Céline Lévesque & Andrew Newcombe, Canada, in COMMENTARIES ONSELECTEDMODEL INVESTMENTTREATIES 53, 74 (Chester Brown ed., 2013).149. Communication from the Commission, supra note 142.150. See the purported text made public by an NGO, Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and
Singapore), September 12, 2011, available at http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?arti-cle20272&lang=en;
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full protection and security, national treatment, and most-favoured-nation (MFN)
treatment as well as guarantees against uncompensated expropriation and an
umbrella clause should be contained by the respective investment chapter.151
However, the Council’s mandates provide that portfolio investment, dispute
settlement, and expropriation are aspects to be concluded as mixed agreements.152
Thus, the issue of the exact scope of the EU’s investment competence remains
contested.
The final text of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the
EU and Canada (CETA), including a chapter on investment, was published on 29
February 2016.153 The final text departs from the previously adopted text of 2014 in
that it provides for a new dispute settlement mechanism moving towards a
permanent multilateral investment court. The EU-Vietnam FTA includes an
investment chapter and was finalized and published in January 2016.154. The EU
and Singapore have initialled the text of a FTA (which also includes an investment
chapter) on 20 September 2013.155 The TTIP between the U.S. and EU, has entered
its 13th round of negotiations in April 2016.156 Negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, and
Tunisia were launched in 2011, but not much progress had been noted for some
time.157 Aside from these, negotiations on the EU-Morocco Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area were launched on 1 March 2013.158 On 25 March 2013, EU-Japan
negotiations were officially launched and a report to the Council assessing the
progress achieved during the first year of negotiations with Japan is currently being
finalized within the Commission.159 Negotiations of a BIT with China are also
imminent, which would be the first stand-alone bilateral investment treaty
151. On the negotiations with Canada see The Challenges of ‘Marrying’ Investment Liberalisation and
Protection in the Canada-EU CETA, in EU AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: OPEN QUESTIONS ANDREMAININGCHALLENGES 121 (Marc Bungenberg, et al. eds., 2013).152. See the purported text made public by an NGO, supra note 149.153. See consolidated version of the negotiated CETA text, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/do-clib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf.154. See consolidated version of the negotiated EU-Vietnam FTA text, available at http://trade.ec.eu-ropa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437.155. For the authentic text as of May 2015 text of the agreement see, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/do-clib/press/index.cfm?id=961.156. The chapter on investment protection has so far been excluded from the negotiations, see Report of
the Tenth Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (July 2015)
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153667.pdf.157. Marc Bungenberg and C. Titi, Developments in International Investment Law, in EUROPEANYEARBOOKOF INTERNATIONALECONOMICLAW 429 (Christoph Herrmann, Markus Krajewski & JörgPhilipp Terhechte eds., 2014).158. See Press Release, European Commission, EU and Morocco Start Negotiation for Closer Trade Ties(April 22, 2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=888.159. See European Commission Trade Policy on Japan, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/coun-tries-and-regions/countries/japan/.
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concluded by the EU.160
V. Conclusion
As this paper demonstrates, there are good arguments in favour of the broad
interpretation of the new competence of the EU in the field of investment. This is
particularly evident given the need to have a system that will grant the EU the
power to act as efficiently as its competitors, namely the US and China.  From that
perspective, an adequate transfer of competences to the European level is necessary
for the EU to establish a coherent trade and investment policy.161 Hence, the EU
must enjoy the exclusive and comprehensive competence to enter into international
investment obligations, covering admission, capital movement (transfer), post-
admission treatment including fair and equitable treatment (FET), performance
requirements and free movement of key personnel, compensation for expropriation,
and investor–state dispute settlement. Indeed, the European Commission assumes
that all such issues that are typically regulated in bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) fall under this new exclusive competence of the EU, while the Council insists
on national competences regarding the protection of expropriation and dispute
resolution clauses. It will be up to the Court of Justice of the European Union to
settle these divergent views. If one takes into account the tendencies of its previous
case law, the court is likely to rule in favour of the Commissions’ view.162
160. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Proposes to Open Negotiations for an Invest-ment Agreement with China (May 23, 2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/in-dex.cfm?id=900.161. See Bungenberg, supra note 7, at 35.162. A clarification from the Court of Justice of the European Union was requested by the Commissionconcerning the EU-Singapore FTA. The court’s decision is pending. Decision of 30 October 2014,European Commission Decision Requesting an Opinion of the Court of Justice Pursuant to Article218(11) TFEU on the competence of the Union to Sign and Conclude a Free Trade Agreement withSingapore, C(2014) 8218 final, available at http://ec.europa.eu/transpar-ency/regdoc/rep/3/2014/EN/3-2014-8218-EN-F1-1.PDF.
